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ABSTRACT. A common strategy in economic modeling is to try to manipulate Bell-
man equations into advantageous forms without breaking their link to optimality.
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework and a set of results that transform
this art into a science. In particular, we (a) clarify the link between such manipu-
lations and optimality of the resulting policies, including when this link breaks
down, (b) establish a connection between contractivity of the modified Bellman
operators and Bellman’s principle of optimality, (c) use manipulations of the Bell-
man equation to extend the set of algorithms for obtaining optimal policies, (d)
extend the set of models that can be transformed to include recursive preferences
and other forms of nonseparability, (e) find new applications of these manipula-
tions and use them to obtain new results, and (f) use these methods to simplify the
Bellman equation in a range of recent applications.
JEL Classifications: C61, E00
Keywords: Dynamic programming, optimality
1. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic programming is central to the analysis of intertemporal planning prob-
lems in economics, finance and operations research.2 When combined with statis-
tical learning, dynamic programming also drives a number of strikingly powerful
1We thank Jaap Abbring, Boyan Jovanovic, Fedor Iskhakov, Takashi Kamihigashi, Larry Liu
and Daisuke Oyama for valuable feedback and suggestions, as well as audience members at the
Econometric Society meeting in Auckland in 2018 and the 2nd Conference on Structural Dynamic
Models in Copenhagen. Financial support from ARC Discovery Grant DP120100321 is gratefully
acknowledged.
Email addresses: qingyin.ma@anu.edu.au, john.stachurski@anu.edu.au
2For surveys and textbook treatments of intertemporal problems that include applications of
dynamic programming across various subfields, see, for example, Rust (1996a), Pissarides (2000),
Duffie (2010), Bergemann and Valimaki (2017), Bertsekas (2017) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2018).
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
01
94
0v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  5
 N
ov
 20
18
2algorithms in artificial intelligence and automated decision systems.3 Its effective-
ness lies in a form of dimensionality reduction, which in turn rests on recursive
structure generated by the unidirectional motion of time.
Dynamic programming is most efficient when the problem in question is low di-
mensional, when the associated policy and value functions are defined on rela-
tively small finite sets or are smooth and easily approximated, and when rewards
are bounded, so that the standard contraction mapping arguments apply.4 Con-
versely, dynamic programming is hampered when the state space is high dimen-
sional, when the value function contains jumps or other irregularities, or when
rewards are unbounded.5
One way to mitigate these problems is to change the angle of attack by rearrang-
ing the planning problem. The idea is to preserve the optimal policy while modifying
the Bellman equation into a more advantageous form. Such manipulations are hence-
forth called “plan factorizations” for reasons described below. An important early
example is Jovanovic (1982), in which a firm decision problem is solved using a
modified Bellman equation based on an action-contingent, time-shifted version of
the value function. In particular, the value of a firm is computed from the point
in time where the decision to continue has already been made, and firms act opti-
mally in all subsequent periods. This approach gives a sharper and more intuitive
view of the firm problem than the standard Bellman equation (which assumes that
firms act optimally at the current stage as well).
Another early example of plan factorization can be found in the foundational study
of regenerative optimal stopping by Rust (1987), where a modified Bellman equa-
tion is constructed from expected value, conditional on the decision to either stop
or continue in the current period and behave optimally thereafter. The objective is
to simplify the Bellman equation and hence the estimation of underlying param-
eters. Expected value methods are now widely applied in the fields of discrete
choice and structural dynamics to simplify estimation or reduce computational
complexity.6
3For an overview see Kochenderfer (2015).
4Rust (1996b) provides a valuable discussion of practical aspects of dynamic programming.
5Additional difficulties arise when preferences are not additively separable over time, a point
we return to below.
6The set of applications is too large to list but valuable theoretical treatments can be found in
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) and Norets (2010).
3These and other plan factorizations have since been adopted across a large ar-
ray of economic applications. For example, in the context of dynamic discrete
choice models, Kristensen et al. (2018) consider three versions of the Bellman equa-
tion, corresponding to the value function, expected value function and “integrated
value function” respectively. Mogensen (2018) compares these methods further us-
ing numerical experiments. Winberry (2018) tackles a household problem using a
plan factorization that integrates transient shocks out of the value function in order
to act on a lower dimensional space than the standard value function. Loertscher
and McLennan (2018) use a plan factorization to aid their analysis of smoothness
of value and policy functions in the context of Bayesian learning. Other recent
applications of dynamic programming that involve related manipulations of the
Bellman equation can be found in Fajgelbaum et al. (2017), Schaal (2017), Abbring
et al. (2018) and many other papers.
When viewed as a whole, these contributions raise many questions on the set
of possible plan factorizations in dynamic programming and the relationship be-
tween them. For example, if we take any one of these plan factorizations in any
given context, is it always the case that this transformation leaves the optimal pol-
icy invariant, in the sense that the policy computed from the fixed point of the
transformed Bellman operator is equal to the optimal policy? This is nontrivial
because the transformations in question are not in general bijective—in fact some
are constructed precisely so that their range space is lower dimensional than their
domain.
More generally, given a fixed dynamic programming problem, do the Bellman op-
erators corresponding to all possible plan factorizations have unique fixed points?
Does existence and uniqueness of a fixed point in one case imply existence and
uniqueness for the others? Does convergence of the successive iterates of any one
of these operators imply convergence of the others? If one of these operators is a
contraction mapping, does this confer some form of optimality on the associated
policy in the same way that it does for the standard Bellman operator?
In addition, the relative rate of convergence for the respective Bellman operators
is also unknown. Assuming that all operators have unique fixed points that are
meaningful in terms of optimality, is it the case that they all converge at the same
rate? Could it be that one of these operators converges to a given level of tolerance
(or produces a policy of higher value) with a smaller number of steps? Might it be
4the case that one sequence of iterates always converges while some of the others
fail to converge at all?
There are additional questions that concern algorithms. Under the standard for-
mulation of the dynamic programming problem, we have access to methods be-
yond value function iteration that can be effective in certain settings, such as policy
iteration and optimistic policy iteration. Do we always have analogous methods
under any given plan factorization? Do they have the same convergence proper-
ties? How do we deploy them?
An extra layer of complication arises if we wish to address these questions while
at the same time accommodating the kinds of modifications to intertemporal pref-
erences increasingly used in economic applications. For example, how do the an-
swers to the questions posed above change if, say, the additively separable prefer-
ences that lie behind the plan factorization used by Winberry (2018) are replaced
by Epstein–Zin preferences (see, e.g., Epstein and Zin (1989) or Weil (1990)), or if
we introduce the desire for robustness described in Hansen and Sargent (2008), or
the ambiguity sensitive preferences presented in Klibanoff et al. (2009)?7
Another question with obvious value is whether or not there are significant new
uses for plan factorizations that are yet to be discovered, which might be brought to
light by a systematic treatment. For example, while the manipulations discussed
in the applications listed above have been adopted either to reduce dimension,
facilitate estimation, increase smoothness or sharpen intuition, it is natural to ask
whether similar manipulations can help with other stumbling blocks for dynamic
programming encountered in applications, such as unbounded reward functions
or failure of contractivity.
In this paper we construct a theory of plan factorizations in dynamic programming
that can be used to address all of the questions listed above. The analysis is general
enough to include all plan factorizations used to date as special cases. In addition,
the theory is embedded in an abstract dynamic programming framework that al-
lows for both standard and nonstandard preferences, including Epstein–Zin style
recursive preferences, desire for robustness and risk and ambiguity sensitivity.
7Further applications of nonseparable preferences can be found in Epstein and Zin (1989), Tallar-
ini (2000), Hansen et al. (2006), Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010), Ju and Miao (2012), Wang et al.
(2016), Bhandari et al. (2017), Kaplan and Violante (2014), Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018), Bloise and
Vailakis (2018), Schorfheide et al. (2018) and many other sources.
5One theoretical contribution of the paper is to provide conditions under which
all of the possible alternative timings have “equal rights,” in the sense that, when
the modified value function associated with a given plan factorization satisfies the
similarly modified Bellman equation, Bellman’s principle of optimality applies: at
least one optimal policy exists, and the set of optimal policies is characterized by
the pointwise maximality of their actions vis-a-vis the modified Bellman equation.
Under the same conditions we show that contractivity and other forms of asymp-
totic stability for the modified Bellman operators associated with these plan fac-
torizations lead to existence of optimal policies and methods of computing these
policies that parallel the traditional methods. The conditions are typically satisfied
in applications and center around monotonicity with respect to future value.
We also provide examples showing that the monotonicity requirements in these
results cannot be dropped and discuss the problems that can result from failure of
monotonicity. While such problems are unlikely to be encountered with additively
separable preferences and standard plan factorizations, they do need to be consid-
ered when we switch to more sophisticated preferences or adopt less standard plan
factorizations.
Furthermore, we show that, with or without monotonicity, the successive iterates
of these modified Bellman operators, of which there exist an infinite number due
to the infinity of possible plan factorizations, all converge at the same rate in one
sense: the n-th iterate of the Bellman operator can alternatively be produced by it-
erating n− 1 times with a modified Bellman operator and then performing at most
two manipulations (and vice versa). At the same time, if we think of convergence
in terms of a specific metric over functions, we find it possible that one operator
converges at a geometric rate while another fails to converge at all.
We also treat algorithms for computing optimal policies in addition to successive
iteration methods. We focus on so-called optimistic policy iteration, which con-
tains policy iteration and value function iteration as special cases, and which can
typically be tuned to converge faster than either one in specific applications. We
show that, under a combination of contractivity and the same monotonicity condi-
tions mentioned above, the sequence of policies generated by a refactored version
of optimistic policy iteration converge to optimality when measured in terms of
the lifetime value they produce.
Regarding applications, plan factorizations have most often been adopted to re-
duce dimensionality, exploit the smoothing properties of conditional expectations
6or provide a more suitable setting for some form of estimation. We generalize and
extend these ideas, applying them in a range of new settings. To illustrate our
theoretical results, we use them to simplify the decision problems presented in a
range of recent work, with applications in pairwise difference estimation, robust
control, optimal savings with stochastic discounting, targeted government trans-
fers, consumer bankruptcy, optimal default and portfolio choice with annuities.
In addition, we provide a new application of plan factorizations, showing how
a certain transformation can map certain dynamic programs with unbounded re-
wards into bounded problems, where standard contraction methods based on supre-
mum norms can be applied. To illustrate the value of this approach, we use a
plan factorization to convert the savings problem in Benhabib et al. (2015) from an
unbounded problem—with unboundedness caused by the kinds of unbounded
utility functions routinely used in economic modeling—into a bounded one. In a
similar vein, we use a plan factorization to extend the optimality results for risk
sensitive preferences presented in Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018) to a larger class of
models, including those with standard utility functions that are unbounded below.
Perhaps the closest result to the theoretical component of our work in the eco-
nomic literature is Rust (1994), which discusses the connection between the fixed
point of a modified Bellman equation and optimality of the policy that results from
choosing the maximal action at each state evaluated according to this fixed point.
This result is specific to one specialized class of dynamic programming problems,
with discrete choices and additively separable preferences, and refers to one spe-
cific plan factorization associated with the expected value function. In contrast,
our result considers all dynamic programming problems in economics of which
we are aware, and can accommodate all existing plan factorizations and a range of
new ones. We also consider sufficient conditions for optimality, such as contractiv-
ity and monotonicity of the modified Bellman operator, rates of convergence, and
the way that these optimality conditions interact with a wide range of algorithms.
Finally, our paper contains new applications of plan factorizations, as discussed
above.
Some related ideas can also be found in the literature on applied mathematics and
artificial intelligence. For example, the Q-learning algorithm (see, e.g., Kochen-
derfer (2015)) is built around a functional equation for “state-action” value, which
computes lifetime value conditional on current action and subsequent optimal be-
havior, including both current and expected future rewards. The key functional
7equation is special case of what is covered here within the concept of plan fac-
torizations (although the Q-learning algorithm itself is significantly different, in
that the assumed knowledge of the controller regarding state transitions and re-
wards is much lower than the settings we consider.) The method of integrating
out “uncontrollable states” (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2017), section 1.4) is related to the
technique used in Winberry (2018). This is another special case of the decomposi-
tions treated below, corresponding to a specific plan factorization and additively
separable preferences.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem.
Section 3 discusses optimality and algorithms. Section 4 gives one set of applica-
tions and section 5 gives another. All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2. GENERAL FORMULATION
This section presents an abstract dynamic programming problem and the key con-
cepts and operators related to plan factorization. Moreover, fundamental proper-
ties regarding fixed points and iterations of the key operators are derived.
2.1. Problem Statement. We useN to denote the set of natural numbers andN0 :=
{0}∪N, whileRE is the set of real-valued functions defined on some set E. In what
follows, a dynamic programming problem consists of
• a set X called the state space,
• a set A called the action space,
• a nonempty correspondence Γ from X to A called the feasible correspondence,
along with the associated set of state-action pairs
F := {(x, a) ∈ X× A : a ∈ Γ(x)},
• a subset V of RX called the set of candidate value functions, and
• a state-action aggregator Q mapping F×V to R∪ {−∞}.
The interpretation of Q(x, a, v) is the lifetime value associated with choosing action
a at current state x and then continuing with a reward function v attributing value
to states. In other words, Q(x, a, v) is an abstract representation of the value to be
8maximized on the right hand side of the Bellman equation. This abstract represen-
tation accommodates a wide variety of separable and nonseparable preferences.8
Example 2.1. If we take the Bellman equation
v(w) = max
06c6w
{
u(c) + βE v(R′(w− c) + y′)}
from Benhabib et al. (2015), where w is wealth, c is current consumption, R′ and
y′ are IID draws of return on assets and non-financial income respectively, then,
assuming the household cannot borrow, X = A = R+, the feasible correspondence
is Γ(w) = [0, w], the set V is some subset of the continuous functions from R+ to
R∪ {−∞} and
Q(w, c, v) := u(c) + βE v(R′(w− c) + y′).
To shift to Epstein–Zin preferences, as in, say, Kaplan and Violante (2014), we can
adjust Q to
Q(w, c, v) =
{
(1− β)u(c)ρ + β [E v(R′(w− c) + y′)α]ρ/α}1/ρ ,
where α and ρ are parameters.
Returning to the general case, we can associate to our abstract dynamic program-
ming problem the Bellman equation
v(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X. (1)
Stating that v ∈ V solves the Bellman equation is equivalent to stating that v is a
fixed point of the Bellman operator, in this case given by
T v(x) := max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v).
2.2. Policies and Assumptions. Let Σ denote the set of feasible policies, which we
define as all σ : X→ A satisfying σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) for all x ∈ X and
v ∈ V and w(x) = Q(x, σ(x), v) on X =⇒ w ∈ V. (2)
8Our abstract framework is motivated by the treatment of dynamic programming in Bertsekas
(2013). Although the presentation here and below focuses on stationary infinite horizon problems,
nonstationary and finite horizon problems can also be incorporated by including time as a state
variable and allowing for nonstationary policies.
9Given v ∈ V, a feasible policy σ with the property that
Q(x, σ(x), v) = sup
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v) for all x ∈ X (3)
is called v-greedy. In other words, a v-greedy policy is one we obtain by treating v
as the value function and maximizing the right hand side of the Bellman equation.
The following assumption allows us to work with maximal decision rules, rather
than suprema. Combined with (2), it also implies that T maps V into itself.
Assumption 2.1. At least one v-greedy policy exists in Σ for each v in V.
Given σ ∈ Σ, any function vσ in V satisfying
vσ(x) = Q(x, σ(x), vσ) for all x ∈ X
is called a σ-value function. We understand vσ(x) as the lifetime value of following
policy σ now and forever, starting from current state x.
Assumption 2.2. For each σ ∈ Σ, there is exactly one σ-value function in V, de-
noted in what follows by vσ.
Assumption 2.2 is simple to verify for regular Markov decision processes with
bounded rewards and discount factors in (0, 1) using, say, Banach’s contraction
mapping theorem or the Neumann series lemma. At the same time, it can be diffi-
cult to establish in models where rewards are unbounded or dynamic preferences
are specified recursively.9 Nevertheless, assumption 2.2 is a minimal requirement
because when it fails the fundamental objective of dynamic programming—that
is, maximization of lifetime value—is not well defined.
2.3. Decompositions and Plan Factorizations. Next we introduce plan factoriza-
tions in a relatively abstract form, motivated by the desire to accommodate all
existing transformations and admit new ones, both for additively separable and
for recursive preference models. As a start, let H be the set of all functions h in RF
9See, for example, Epstein and Zin (1989), Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010), Ba¨uerle and
Jas´kiewicz (2018) or Bloise and Vailakis (2018). The restrictions on primitives used to obtain the
existence and uniqueness requirement in assumption 2.2 vary substantially across applications,
which is why we have chosen to assume it directly.
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FIGURE 1. The one-shift operators
such that, for some v ∈ V we have h(x, a) = Q(x, a, v) for all (x, a) ∈ F and let M
be the operator defined at h ∈ H by
(Mh)(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
h(x, a). (4)
In the sequel, a plan factorization associated with the dynamic program described
above is a pair of operators (W0, W1) such that
(1) W0 is defined on V and takes values inG := W0V,10
(2) W1 is defined onG and takes values in H and
(3) the composition W1 ◦W0 satisfies
(W1 W0 v)(x, a) = Q(x, a, v) for all (x, a) ∈ F, v ∈ V. (5)
Equation (5) states that W0 and W1 provide a decomposition (or factorization) of
Q, so that each element Wi implements a separate component of the two stage (i.e.,
present and future) planning problem associated with the Bellman equation.
Evidently, given the definition of M in (4) and the factorization requirement (5), for
each plan factorization (W0, W1), the Bellman operator T can be decomposed as
T = M ◦W1 ◦W0. (6)
A visualization is given in figure 1, where W0, W1 and M are clockwise rotations
and T is a cycle starting from V.
10More explicitly,G is the set of g ∈ RF such that g = W0 v for some v ∈ V.
11
Corresponding to this same plan factorization (W0, W1), we introduce a refactored
Bellman operator S onG defined by
S = W0 ◦M ◦W1. (7)
In figure 1, S is a cycle starting fromG. Corresponding to S, we have the refactored
Bellman equation g = W0 M W1 g. Evidently fixed points of S are solutions to the
refactored Bellman equation and vice versa. The refactored Bellman operator and
refactored Bellman equation are possible implementations of an action-contingent
value transformation, in the sense that they manipulate the Bellman operator and
Bellman equation while attempting to preserve optimality of the policy they pro-
duce. In fact preservation of optimality requires additional assumptions, to be
discussed below.11
2.4. Examples. This section helps illustrate how plan factorizations and the refac-
tored Bellman operators they generate can represent the kinds of manipulations
of the Bellman equation currently used in economic modeling. (We focus on rela-
tively simple cases, with more complex examples deferred to sections 4–5.)
2.4.1. Optimal Savings. Consider a household savings problem such as found in,
say, Krusell and Smith (1998), with Bellman equation
v(w, z, η) = max
c, w′,`
{
u(c, `) + βE z v(w′, z′, η′)
}
(8)
subject to
w′ + c 6 R(z)w + q(z, η)`, c, w′ > 0 and 0 6 ` 6 1. (9)
Here w is wealth, R(z) is a gross rate of return on financial assets, c is consumption,
` is labor, {ηt} are IID innovations, {zt} is a Markov state process and E z condi-
tions on current state z. The constraint set Γ(w, z, η) is all c, w′, ` satisfying (9). The
state-action aggregator Q for this model is
Q(w, z, η, w′, c, `) = u(c, `) + βE z v(w′, z′, η′). (10)
11In some dynamic programs, the controller has the option of stopping or exiting the decision
loop in some states or actions. Such state-action pairs have the property that the continuation value
does not depend on the candidate value function. We can treat them efficiently by introducing a
subset Fe of F and a function e : Fe → R such that Q(x, a, v) = e(x, a) for all v ∈ V and (x, a) ∈ Fe.
It is immediate from the definitions of the two Bellman operators that their images depend only on
primitives on the set Fe. Hence we can ignore these states during iteration of any of these operators,
reinserting them only when greedy policies are calculated.
12
We can use the law of iterated expectations to rewrite the Bellman equation as
v(w, z, η) = max
c, w′,`
{
u(c, `) + βE zE z′ v(w′, z′, η′)
}
. (11)
Next, analogous to Winberry (2018), we set
g(w, z) := E z v(w, z, η) (12)
and rearrange (11) to eliminate v, producing the modified Bellman equation
g(w, z) = E z max
c,w′,`
{
u(c, `) + βE z g(w′, z′)
}
, (13)
with the same constraint (9). The transient shock η is integrated out by the outer
expectation in (13), implying that g in (13) acts on a space one dimension lower
than v in (8).
Now let us connect (13) to the theoretical framework presented above. To this end,
consider the plan factorization (W0, W1) defined by
(W0 v)(w, z) := E z v(w, z, η) and (W1 g)(w′, z, c, `) := u(c, `) + βE zg(w′, z′).
Evidently W0 and W1 factorize Q from (10) in the sense of condition (5), since, by
construction,
(W1 W0 v)(w, z, η, w′, c, `) = u(c, `) + βE zE z′ v(w′, z′, η′) = Q(w, z, η, w′, c, `).
In addition, using the definition of M in (4), we have
(M W1 g)(w, z, η) = max
c,w′,`
{
u(c, `) + βE z g(w′, z′)
}
,
where the dependence on η is due to the constraint (9). Applying W0 to this last
expression gives (13). In other words, the modified Bellman equation (13) can be
expressed as g = W0 M W1 g. Hence, g solves (13) if and only if g is a fixed point of
the refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 induced by the plan factorization
(W0, W1).
2.4.2. Job Search. Consider a version of the McCall (1970) job search model with IID
wage offers {wt} and unemployment compensation {ηt}. Ignoring complications
such as job separation, the Bellman equation for the agent is
v(w, η) = max
{
u(w)
1− β , u(η) + βE v(w
′, η′)
}
. (14)
13
The state-action aggregator Q for this model can be expressed as
Q(w, η, a) = a
u(w)
1− β + (1− a)
[
u(η) + βE v(w′, η′)
]
where a ∈ Γ(w, η) := {0, 1} is a binary choice variable, with a = 1 indicating the
decision to stop.
It is common to transform the Bellman equation for this problem using the contin-
uation value g(η) := u(η) + βE v(w′, η′). Using g to eliminate v from (14) gives
g(η) = u(η) + βE max
{
u(w′)
1− β , g(η
′)
}
,
a functional equation in one dimension. We can in fact do better by using the ex-
pected value function, analogous to the technique used by Rust (1987) in the con-
text of regenerative optimal stopping. In particular, we can take g := E v(w′, η′)
and eliminate v from the Bellman equation to obtain the scalar equation
g = E max
{
u(w′)
1− β , u(η
′) + βg
}
. (15)
To frame this transformation in terms of the refactored Bellman operator, consider
the plan factorization (W0, W1) defined by
W0 v = E v(w′, η′) and (W1 g)(η, w, a) = a
u(w)
1− β + (1− a) [u(η) + βg] . (16)
Notice that the functional equation (15) can be rewritten as
g = E
{
max
a∈{0,1}
{
a
u(w′)
1− β + (1− a)[u(η
′) + βg]
}}
, (17)
which, with the definitions of W0 and W1 just given, is equivalent to g = W1 M W0 g.
Thus, a scalar g solves (15) if and only if it is a fixed point of the refactored Bellman
operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 generated by the factorization in (16).
2.5. Refactored Policy Values. Returning to the general setting, we also wish to
consider the value of policies under the transformation associated with a given
plan factorization (W0, W1). To this end, for each σ ∈ Σ and each h ∈ H, we define
the operator Mσ : H→ V by
Mσh(x) := h(x, σ(x)). (18)
14
That Mσ does in fact mapH intoV follows from the definition of these spaces and
(2).12 Comparing with M defined in (4), we have, for each h ∈ H,
Mσh 6 Mh and Mσh = Mh for at least one σ ∈ Σ. (19)
The inequality in (19) is obvious. To see that the existence claim holds, observe
that, by the definition of H, there exists a v ∈ V such that h = W1W0v. For this v,
by assumption 2.1, there exists a σ in Σ such that Mσ W1 W0 v = M W1 W0 v. Since
h = W1 W0 v, this verifies the second claim in (19).
Given σ ∈ Σ, the operator Tσ from V to itself defined by Tσv(x) = Q(x, σ(x), v)
for all x ∈ X will be called the σ-value operator. By construction, it has the property
that vσ is the σ-value function corresponding to σ if and only if it is a fixed point
of Tσ. With the notation introduced above, we can express it as
Tσ = Mσ ◦W1 ◦W0
Analogous to the definition of the refactored Bellman operator in (7), we introduce
the refactored σ-value operator
Sσ := W0 ◦Mσ ◦W1
corresponding to a given plan factorization (W0, W1). A fixed point gσ of Sσ is
called a refactored σ-value function. The value gσ(x, a) can be interpreted as the value
of following policy σ in all subsequent periods, conditional on current action a.
2.6. Fixed Points and Iteration. We begin with some preliminary results not di-
rectly connected to optimality. Our first result states that, to iterate with T, one
can alternatively iterate with S, since iterates of S can be converted directly into
iterates of T. Moreover, the converse is also true, and similar statements hold for
the policy operators:
Proposition 2.1. For every n ∈ N we have
Sn = W0 ◦ Tn−1 ◦M ◦W1 and Tn = M ◦W1 ◦ Sn−1 ◦W0.
Moreover, for every n ∈ N and every σ ∈ Σ, we have
Snσ = W0 ◦ Tn−1σ ◦Mσ ◦W1 and Tnσ = Mσ ◦W1 ◦ Sn−1σ ◦W0.
12If h ∈ H, then by definition there exists a v ∈ V such that h(x, a) = Q(x, a, v) for all (x, a) ∈ F.
Now Mσh ∈ V follows directly from (2).
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Proposition 2.1 follows from the definitions of T and S along with a simple induc-
tion argument. While the proof is straightforward, the result is worth bearing in
mind because it provides a metric-free statement of the fact that the sequence of
iterates of any refactored Bellman operator converges at the same rate as that of
the standard Bellman operator.
The next result shows a fundamental connection between the two forms of the
Bellman operator in terms of their fixed points.
Proposition 2.2. The Bellman operator T admits a unique fixed point v¯ in V if and only
if the refactored Bellman operator S admits a unique fixed point g¯ in G. Whenever these
fixed points exist, they are related by v¯ = M W1 g¯ and g¯ = W0 v¯.
Thus, if a unique fixed point of the Bellman operator is desired but T is difficult to
work with, a viable option is to show that S has a unique fixed point, compute it,
and then recover the unique fixed point of T via v¯ = M W1 g¯.
The fact that T has a unique fixed point inV does not by itself allow us to draw any
conclusions about optimality. A discussion of optimality is provided in section 3.
A result analogous to proposition 2.2 holds for the policy operators:
Proposition 2.3. Given σ ∈ Σ, the refactored σ-value operator Sσ has a unique fixed point
gσ in G if and only if Tσ has a unique fixed point vσ in V. Whenever these fixed points
exist, they are related by vσ = Mσ W1 gσ and gσ = W0 vσ.
Proposition 2.3 implies that, under assumption 2.2, there exists exactly one refac-
tored σ-value function gσ in G for every σ ∈ Σ. Proposition 2.3 is also useful for
the converse implication. In particular, to establish assumption 2.2, which is of-
ten nontrivial when preferences are not additively separable, we can equivalently
show that Sσ has a unique fixed point in G. An application of this idea that illus-
trates its value is given in section 4.
3. OPTIMALITY
Next we turn to optimality, with a particular focus on the properties that must
be placed on a given plan factorization in order for the corresponding (refactored)
Bellman equation to lead us to optimal actions. Our first step, however, is to define
optimality and recall some standard results.
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3.1. Fixed Points and Optimal Policies. The value function associated with our
dynamic program is defined at x ∈ X by
v∗(x) = sup
σ∈Σ
vσ(x). (20)
A feasible policy σ∗ is called optimal if vσ∗ = v∗ on X. This corresponds to the usual
definition when rewards are additively separable. Bellman’s principle of optimality
states that a policy is optimal if and only if it is v∗-greedy.
The next theorem is a trivial extension of foundational optimality results for dy-
namic decision problems. Its proof is included in the appendix for the reader’s
convenience. The assumptions of section 2.2 are taken to be in force.
Theorem 3.1. The next two statements are equivalent:
(1) The value function v∗ lies in V and satisfies the Bellman equation.
(2) Bellman’s principle of optimality holds and the set of optimal policies is nonempty.
It is natural to ask whether a result analogous to theorem 3.1 holds for the refac-
tored Bellman operator S. Indeed, the entire motivation behind the transforma-
tions in question is that the Bellman equation can be refactored into a more con-
venient form without affecting optimality. By the last statement we mean that the
optimal policy remains accessible through a version of Bellman’s principle of opti-
mality (i.e., computing the maximizing action associated with the right hand side
of the refactored Bellman equation at each point in the state space produces the
optimal policy).
We now show that, while some care in treating this problem is required, a result
analogous to theorem 3.1 can be established if a form of monotonicity holds for the
transformation being used in the plan factorization. Before we get to this result,
however, we need to address the following complication: there are two distinct
functions that can take the part of v∗ in theorem 3.1. One is the rotated value
function
gˆ := W0 v∗. (21)
In general, gˆ is a function of both state x and action a.
Example 3.1. In the optimal savings problem of section 2.4.1, we considered the
integrated value function g(w, z) := E z v(w, z, η), which was expressed in terms
of a plan factorization as g(w, z) = (W0 v)(w, z). If v = v∗, the value function
associated with this optimal savings problem, then gˆ(w, z) = (W0 v∗)(w, z).
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The second function we need to consider as a possible fixed point of S is
g∗(x, a) := sup
σ∈Σ
gσ(x, a). (22)
We call g∗ the refactored value function. The definition of g∗ directly parallels the def-
inition of the value function in (20), with g∗(x, a) representing the maximal value
that can be obtained from state x conditional on choosing a in the current period.
In this sense it is more consequential than gˆ, which is important only because it is
obtained by rotating v∗. (Since assumption 2.2 is in force, the set of functions {gσ}
in the definition of g∗ is well defined (see proposition 2.3), and hence so is g∗ as an
extended real-valued function, although it might or might not live inG.)
As shown below, the functions gˆ and g∗ are not in general equal, although they
become so when a certain form of monotonicity is imposed. Moreover, under this
same monotonicity condition, if one and hence both of these functions are fixed
points of S, we obtain valuable optimality results.
In stating these results, we recall that a map A from one partially ordered set (E,6)
to another such set (F,6) is called isotone if x 6 y implies Ax 6 Ay. Below,
isotonicity is with respect to the pointwise partial order on V, G and H. Also,
given g ∈ G, a policy σ ∈ Σ is called g-greedy if Mσ W1 g = M W1 g. As a result of
assumption 2.1, at least one such policy exists for every g ∈ G.13
Theorem 3.2. Let (W0, W1) be a plan factorization, let gˆ be as defined in (21) and let g∗
be as defined in (22). If W0 and W1 are both isotone, then the following statements are
equivalent:
(1) g∗ lies inG and satisfies the refactored Bellman equation.
(2) v∗ lies in V and satisfies the Bellman equation.
If either one of these conditions holds, then g∗ = gˆ, the set of optimal policies is nonempty
and, for σ ∈ Σ, we have
σ is optimal ⇐⇒ σ is g∗-greedy ⇐⇒ σ is v∗-greedy. (23)
13By definition, g ∈ G implies the existence of a v ∈ V such that g = W0 v, and to this v
there corresponds a v-greedy policy σ by assumption 2.1. At this σ we have Q(x, σ(x), v) =
maxa∈Γ(x) Q(x, a, v) for every x ∈ X, or, equivalently, Mσ W1 W0 v = M W1 W0 v pointwise on V.
Since g = W0 v, this policy is g-greedy.
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One notable aspect of this result is that, if one wishes to identify properties of the
optimal policy such as monotonicity or continuity, then, under the stated condi-
tions, the standard and refactored approaches are equally valid, since, by (23), the
policies they produce exactly coincide (and equal the optimal policies).
Example 3.2. Observe that the operators W0 and W1 that form the plan factoriza-
tion for the optimal savings problem considered in section 2.4.1 are both isotone,
so if we can show that the refactored value function g∗ satisfies (13), then by theo-
rem 3.2 at least one optimal policy exists, g∗(w, z) = gˆ(w, z) = E zv∗(w, z, η), and
a policy σ ∈ Σ is optimal if and only if
σ(w, z) ∈ argmax
c,w′,`
{
u(c, `) + βE z g∗(w′, z′)
}
subject to the constraint (9) for all (w, z) ∈ R2+.
More sophisticated applications of theorem 3.2 are deferred to sections 4–5. Also,
theorem 3.2 does not address the issue of how to establish that g∗ satisfies the
refactored Bellman equation. This problem is considered in section 3.3.
3.2. The Role of Monotonicity. Isotonicity of W0 and W1 cannot be dropped from
theorem 3.2 without changing its conclusions. In section 6.5 of the appendix we
exhibit dynamic programs and plan factorizations that illustrate the following pos-
sibilities:
(1) gˆ 6= g∗
(2) Tv∗ = v∗ and yet Sg∗ 6= g∗
(3) Sg∗ = g∗ and yet Tv∗ 6= v∗
While our examples are stylized, transformations where isotonicity fails are not
difficult to envisage, particularly as the modeling of preferences becomes more
sophisticated. For example, consider a risk-sensitive control problem with Bellman
equation
v(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
{
r(x, a)− β
γ
ln
∫
exp(−γv(F(x, a, z)))µ(dz)
}
as in, say, Hansen and Sargent (2008) or Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018). Here r is
a current reward function and F(x, a, z) is a transition rule conditional on state x,
action a and shock z (with distribution µ), while β is a discount factor and γ > 0
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controls the degree of risk sensitivity. If, in this context, we use an “integrated
value function” of the form
g(x, a) :=
∫
exp(−γv(F(x, a, z)))µ(dz),
then the operator W0 corresponding to this plan factorization, defined by (W0 v)(x, a) =
g(x, a), is antitone in v, rather than isotone. In contrast, if we use
g(x, a) := (W0 g)(x, a) := − 1
γ
ln
∫
exp(−γv(F(x, a, z)))µ(dz)
then isotonicity holds. (In fact this transformation can produce valuable results, as
shown in section 4.)
Similarly, consider the household problem treated in, say, Kaplan and Violante
(2014), with Bellman equation of the form
v(s) = max
s′
{
u(s, s′)1−σ + β
[
E v(s′, ξ ′)1−γ
](1−σ)/(1−γ)}1/(1−σ)
subject to certain constraints and other features, the details of which are omitted
for the sake of brevity. The parameters σ and γ take values 2/3 and 4 respectively
(p. 1219).
In this setting one might consider a transformation such as g(s′) = E v(s′, ξ ′)1−γ,
which roughly parallels the expected value transformation shown in (12) or (16).
Because γ > 1, this transformation, and the corresponding operator (W0 v)(s′) =
g(s′) is not isotone in v. On the other hand,
g(s′) = (W0 v)(s′) = [E v(s′, ξ ′)1−γ](1−σ)/(1−γ)
is isotone in v, and the remaining component
(W1 g)(s, s′) =
{
u(s, s′)1−σ + βg(s′)
}1/(1−σ)
is isotone in g. Hence theorem 3.2 applies.
3.3. Sufficient Conditions. Theorem 3.2 tells us that if the stated monotonicity
condition holds and Sg∗ = g∗, then we can be assured of the existence of optimal
policies and have a means to characterize them. What we lack is a set of sufficient
conditions under which the refactored Bellman operator has a unique fixed point
that is equal to g∗.
To study this issue, we recall that a self-mapping A on a topological space U is
called asymptotically stable on U if A has a unique fixed point u¯ in U and Anu → u¯
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as n → ∞ for all u ∈ U. In the following, we assume that there exists a Hausdorff
topology τ on G under which the pointwise partial order is closed.14 Asymptotic
stability is with respect to this topology.
In the theorem below, (W0, W1) is a given plan factorization and g∗ is the refactored
value function.
Theorem 3.3. If W0 and W1 are both isotone and {S, Sσ}σ∈Σ are all asymptotically stable
onG, then
(1) g∗ is the unique solution to the refactored Bellman equation inG,
(2) limk→∞ Skg = g∗ under τ for all g ∈ G,
(3) at least one optimal policy exists and
(4) a feasible policy is optimal if and only if it is g∗-greedy.
Thus, under the conditions of theorem 3.3, the refactored Bellman equation does
indeed have “equal rights.” We can (in the limit) compute the refactored value
function g∗ by iterating with this operator, and the policy produced by taking the
maximizer associated with the max operation inside the refactored Bellman equa-
tion evaluated at g∗—what we call the g∗-greedy policy—is optimal.
In theorem 3.3 we eschewed a contractivity assumption on S or Sσ, since such
an assumption is problematic in certain applications (consider the LQ regulator
problem or see the discussion of recursive preferences in Marinacci and Montruc-
chio (2010) or Bloise and Vailakis (2018)). At the same time, contraction methods
can be applied to many other problems, and, as we show in section 4, availabil-
ity of the refactored Bellman operator opens up more. For this reason we add
the next proposition, in the statement of which ‖ · ‖κ is defined at f ∈ RF by
‖ f ‖κ = sup | f /κ|. Here the supremum is over all (x, a) ∈ F and κ is a fixed
“weighting function;” that is, an element of RF satisfying κ > 1 on F. This map-
ping defines a norm on bκF, the set of f ∈ RF such that ‖ f ‖κ < ∞. In this context
we have the following result:
Proposition 3.4. Let W0 and W1 be isotone. IfG is a closed subset of bκF and there exists
a positive constant α such that α < 1 and
‖Sσ g− Sσ g′‖κ 6 α ‖g− g′‖κ for all g, g′ ∈ G and σ ∈ Σ, (24)
14The pointwise partial order 6 is closed with respect to τ if its graph is closed in the product
topology on G×G. The key implication for us is that if fn → f and gn → g under τ and fn 6 gn
for all n, then f 6 g. This assumption holds for most economic applications.
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then S is a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖κ) of modulus α and the conclusions of theo-
rem 3.3 all hold.
The purpose of κ here is to control for unbounded rewards, and a suitable weight-
ing function is typically straightforward to find when rewards are bounded below
but (possibly) unbounded above. When rewards are unbounded below the situ-
ation is more complex, although plan factorizations can mollify this issue, as dis-
cussed in section 4. Conversely, in the case where rewards are bounded both above
and below we can take κ ≡ 1 in proposition 3.4, in which case ‖ · ‖κ is the ordinary
supremum norm and bκF is just the bounded functions on F. Proposition 3.4 is
then a direct analog of the classical theory of dynamic programming based around
contraction mappings (see, e.g, Stokey et al. (1989) or Bertsekas (2017)).
Notice also that the contractivity requirement in (24) is imposed on Sσ rather than
S, making the condition easier to verify (since Sσ does not involve a maximization
step). For an application of proposition 3.4, see section 4.
3.4. Refactored Policy Iteration. Next we give conditions under which optimistic
policy iteration is successful in the setting of a given plan factorization (W0, W1).
The standard algorithm starts with an initial candidate v0 ∈ V and generates se-
quences {σk} and {Σk} in Σ and {vk} in V by taking
σk ∈ Σk and vk+1 = Tmkσk vk for all k ∈ N0, (25)
where Σk is the set of vk-greedy policies, and {mk} is a sequence of positive inte-
gers. The first step of equation (25) is called policy improvement, while the second
step is called partial policy evaluation. If mk = 1 for all k then the algorithm reduces
to value function iteration.
To extend this idea to the refactored case, we take an initial candidate g0 ∈ G and
generate sequences {σk} and {Σk} in Σ and {gk} inG via
σk ∈ Σk and gk+1 = Smkσk gk for all k ∈ N0, (26)
where Σk is the set of gk-greedy policies, and {mk} is a sequence of positive inte-
gers.
The next result shows that (25) and (26) generate the same sequences of greedy
policies.
Proposition 3.5. If v0 ∈ V and g0 = W0 v0, then the sequences {σk} and {Σk} satisfy
(25) if and only if they satisfy (26). Furthermore, gk = W0 vk for all k.
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The next result shows that optimistic policy iteration via the refactored Bellman
operator converges, as for the standard Bellman operator.
Theorem 3.6. Let W0 and W1 be isotone and let S and {Sσ}σ∈Σ be asymptotically stable
onG. If g0 6 Sg0, then gk 6 gk+1 for all k and gk → g∗ as k→ ∞.
4. APPLICATION SET I: UNBOUNDED REWARDS
As alluded to above, dynamic programming is particularly complex when rewards
are unbounded below, a case not easily handled even by weighted supremum
norms.15 At the same time, such specifications abound in economics. In this sec-
tion, we address these problems using a new approach based on plan factorization.
We show that, in certain applications, while the Bellman operator acts on a space of
functions that are unbounded below, the refactored Bellman operator sends func-
tions that are bounded below into the same class of functions. We use our results
to
(1) extend and clarify the optimality results in Benhabib et al. (2015) and
(2) extend the optimality results for risk sensitive preference models obtained
in Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018) to the case where rewards are unbounded
below.
In both cases we apply a general result for dynamic programming with unbounded
rewards developed in the next section, which exploits a specific plan factorization.
4.1. Theory. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and let L1 = L1(Ω,F ,P) be
all random variables X on Ω with E |X| < ∞. Let R be a certainty equivalent
operator, by which we mean a map from L1 toR satisfyingRα = α for any constant
α andRX 6 RX′ whenever X, X′ ∈ L1 with X 6 X′. Suppose in addition that
(A1)RX 6 EX for all X ∈ L1, and
(A2)R(X + X′) 6 RX +RX′ for all X, X′ ∈ L1.
Here (A1) indicates risk aversion while (A2) is called sub-additivity. These prop-
erties are satisfied by some but not all certainty equivalent operators.16 For all
15See, for example, Boyd (1990), Dura´n (2003), Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodrı´guez-Palmero (2003),
and Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010).
16See, for example, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010), Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018) or Bloise
and Vailakis (2018).
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Borel measurable function h : R2+ → R ∪ {−∞}, we assume that the function
a 7→ Rh(a, ξ) is Borel measurable whenever it is well defined.
Now consider a dynamic programming problem with state-action aggregator
Q(x, a, v) = r(x, a) + βRv[ f (a, ξ)]. (27)
In particular, A = X = R+, Γ(x) = [0, x], the reward function r is defined by
r : D → R∪ {−∞} where D := {(x, a) ∈ X× A : a 6 x},
the function f maps R2+ to R+, ξ is a nonnegative random variable with distribu-
tion µ and β ∈ (0, 1). The Bellman operator corresponding to this problem is
Tv(x) = max
06a6x
{r(x, a) + βRv[ f (a, ξ)]} . (28)
Assumption 4.1. The primitives ( f , ξ, r,R) satisfy the following conditions:
(1) r is continuous17, increasing in its first argument, and decreasing in its sec-
ond.
(2) There exists a constant d > 0 and an increasing continuous function κ :
R+ → [1,∞) such that r(x, 0) 6 dκ(x) for all x ∈ R+.
(3) f is Borel measurable, a 7→ f (a, z) is continuous and increasing for all z,
and, if r is unbounded below, then f (0, z) > 0 for almost all z.
(4) There exist a constant α ∈ (0, 1/β) such that∫
R+
κ[ f (a, z)]µ(dz) 6 ακ(a) for all a ∈ R+.
(5) R[r( f (0, ξ), 0) + α] > −∞ for all constant α.
(6) If h : R2+ → R ∪ {−∞} such that r( f (0, z), 0)− α1 6 h(a, z) 6 α2 κ[ f (a, z)]
for some positive constants α1, α2 and a 7→ h(a, z) is continuous for almost
all z, then a 7→ Rh(a, ξ) is continuous.
Now consider the plan factorization (W0, W1) defined by18
(W0 v)(a) = Rv( f (a, ξ)) and (W1 g)(x, a) = r(x, a) + βg(a).
Let V be the set of Borel measurable functions v : X → R such that W0v ∈ G,
whereG is defined as the set of Borel measurable functions g : R+ → R such that
17For a reward function r that satisfies r ≡ −∞ on D/D0, we say that r is continuous if it is
continuous on D0 and lima→x r(x, a) = −∞.
18Clearly W0 and W1 are isotone and factorize Q in the sense that, for Q defined in (27), we have
Q = W1 ◦W0.
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• ‖g‖κ := supa∈R+ [g(a)/κ(a)] is finite and
• g is increasing, continuous and bounded below.
Lemma 4.1. If assumption 4.1 holds, hg(x) := max06a6x {r(x, a) + βg(a)} and Mg(x) :=
{a ∈ [0, x] : hg(x) = r(x, a) + βg(a)} for all g ∈ G, then
(1) hg is well defined and increasing.
(2) hg is continuous on (0,∞).
(3) hg is continuous everywhere if r(x, a) > −∞ on D/D0.
(4) Mg is nonempty, compact-valued, and upper hemicontinuous.
The refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is then
Sg(a) := R max
06a′6 f (a,ξ)
{
r
(
f (a, ξ), a′
)
+ βg(a′)
}
. (29)
The proof of the next theorem is based on proposition 3.4.
Theorem 4.2. If assumption 4.1 holds, then the refactored Bellman operator S is a con-
traction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖κ). In particular,
(1) g∗ is the unique fixed point of S inG,
(2) Skg converges to g∗ at rate O((αβ)k) under ‖ · ‖κ,
(3) at least one optimal policy exists and
(4) a feasible policy is optimal if and only if it is g∗-greedy.
4.2. Application to Optimal Savings. Benhabib et al. (2015) studies an optimal
savings problem with capital income risk, where wt is wealth, st is saving, Rt is
the rate of return on wealth, It is the labor income, and u is the utility function.
As assumed by Benhabib et al. (2015), the {Rt} and {It} processes are nonnegative
and IID. The Bellman equation is
v(w) = max
06s6w
{
u(w− s) + βE v(R′s + I′)} .
Following Benhabib et al. (2015), we consider u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ) with γ > 1.
As a dynamic program, the only difficulty is that utility is unbounded below, im-
plying that the usual contraction mapping structure based on the supremum norm
cannot be applied. Benhabib et al. (2015) circumvent this issue by assuming that
labor income is bounded away from zero and applying Euler equation methods.
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Here we provide an alternative approach that recasts the problem to a bounded
one using a plan factorization. Doing so allows us to use weaker assumptions and
also avoid appealing to Euler equation methods for optimality results, since such
methods are not robust to certain modifications, including the change of prefer-
ences considered in section 4.3.
We consider the refactored Bellman equation
g(s) = E max
06s′6R′s+I′
{
u(R′s + I′ − s′) + βg(s′)} , (30)
which is a version of (29) under the identifications x := w, a := s and ξ := (R′, I′),
along with r(x, a) := u(w− s), f (a, z) := R′s + I′ and R := E . Conditions (a) and
(c) of assumption 4.1 hold are easy to verify. Since u is bounded above, conditions
(b) and (d) of assumption 4.1 hold trivially by letting κ ≡ 1. SinceRr( f (0, ξ), 0) =
E u(I′), assumption 4.1-(e) holds as long as E u(It) > −∞. Condition (f) then
follows immediately from the dominated convergence theorem. Hence, all the
conclusions of theorem 4.2 hold. In particular, an optimal policy exists. Moreover,
one can show that S maps the set of concave functions in G into itself, and hence,
using part (b) of theorem 4.2, that g∗ is concave. From this fact, the strict concavity
of u and the refactored Bellman equation (30), it is clear that the optimal policy is
unique.
4.3. Application to Risk Sensitive Control. Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018) study
an optimal growth model in the presence of risk sensitive preference (which are
in turn related to robust control problems, as discussed in Hansen and Sargent
(2008)). They provide valuable new optimality results, although these results can-
not treat many common period utility functions, such as CRRA under some pa-
rameterization or log utility, because they exclude all utility functions that are un-
bounded below. Here we extend their results to include such utility functions by
applying the plan factorization behind theorem 4.2.
To represent their model in this framework, let x denote output, let a be invest-
ment, and let r(x, a) := u(x− a) where u is a utility function. For all integrable h,
let
Rh(a, ξ) := φ−1 {E φ[h(a, ξ)]} , where φ(x) = e−γx. (31)
Here the expectation is taken with respect to ξ. The Bellman equation is
v(x) = max
a∈[0,x]
{
u(x− a)− β
γ
ln
∫
R+
exp (−γ v[ f (a, z)]) µ(dz)
}
.
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The refactored Bellman equation corresponding to (29) is
g(a) = − 1
γ
ln
∫
R+
exp
{
−γ max
a′∈[0, f (a,z)]
[
u
(
f (a, z)− a′)+ βg(a′)]} µ(dz). (32)
By proposition 1 and (P4) of Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018), R defined in (31) is a
certainty equivalent operator satisfying (A1)–(A2). Consider, say, u(c) = ln c and
xt+1 = f (at, ξt) = ηat + ξt, {ξt} IID∼ LN(0, σ2),
where η > 0. This case is not covered by Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018) because
utility is unbounded below. However, theorem 4.2 can be applied. Conditions (a)
and (c) of assumption 4.1 obviously hold. Condition (f) follows immediately from
the dominated convergence theorem once condition (e) is established. To verify
condition (e), by the definition ofR, it suffices to show that
L :=
∫
R+
exp{−γu[ f (0, z)]}µ(dz) < ∞.
Since exp {−γu[ f (0, z)]} = exp (−γ ln z) = z−γ and {ξt} is lognormal, we have
L =
∫
R+
z−γµ(dz) = exp
(
γ2σ2/2
)
< ∞
and assumption 4.1-(e) is verified. Moreover, if z¯ :=
∫
zµ(dz), then:
• If η 6 1, then conditions (b) and (d) of assumption 4.1 hold for all β ∈ (0, 1)
by letting α := (β+ 1)/(2β) and κ(a) := a + z¯/(α− 1).
• If η > 1, then conditions (b) and (d) of assumption 4.1 hold for all β ∈
(0, 1/η) by letting α := η and κ(a) := a + z¯/(α− 1).
Hence, assumption 4.1 holds and all the conclusions of theorem 4.2 apply.
5. APPLICATION SET II: DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION
In this section we show how plan factorizations can be used to simplify a range
of recently published applications by reducing dimension. In what follows, E y
denotes the expectation of y and E y|x represents the expectation of y conditional
on x.
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5.1. Pairwise-Difference Estimations. Hong and Shum (2010) develop a pairwise-
difference estimation method for dynamic models with discrete or continuous ac-
tions. To simplify notation and focus on fixed point solutions, we omit the param-
eters and agent indices of the original model. The state variable is (xt, st), where
xt is observed by the econometrician and st is not. The agent’s choice variable is
qt. The reward function is u(xt, st, qt). Moreover, {st} is IID, while {xt} evolves
according to
xt+1 = xt + qt.
The Bellman operator of the problem is
Tv(x, s) = max
q
{
u(x, s, q) + βE x′,s′|x, q v(x′, s′)
}
. (33)
Consider the plan factorization (W0, W1), where
W0v(x) := E sv(x, s) and W1g(x, s, q) := u(x, s, q) + βE x′|x,q g(x′).
The refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is then
Sg(x) = E s maxq
{
u(x, s, q) + βE x′|x, q g(x′)
}
. (34)
Note that g in (34) acts only on x, while v in (33) acts on both x and s.
5.2. Optimal Savings with Stochastic Discounting. Higashi et al. (2009) study
optimal savings with stochastic discounting. Given constant interest rate r and
current savings st, the agent decides current consumption ct and savings st+1 car-
ried to the next period. The agent’s discount factor αt is stochastic and satisfies
{αt} IID∼ µ. Let u be the utility function. The Bellman operator is
Tv(s, α) = max
c, s′
{
(1− α)u(c) + α
∫
v(s′, α′)µ(dα′)
}
(35)
subject to
c + s′ = (1+ r)s and c, s′ > 0. (36)
Consider the plan factorization (W0, W1), where
W0 v(s) :=
∫
v(s, α)µ(dα) and W1 g(s, α, c, s′) := (1− α)u(c) + αg(s′).
Then the refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is
Sg(s) =
∫
max
c, s′
{
(1− α)u(c) + αg(s′)} µ(dα) (37)
subject to (36). While v in (35) acts on s and α, g in (37) acts only on s.
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5.3. Robust Control. Consider the robust control problem studied by Bidder and
Smith (2012) (see also Hansen and Sargent (2008)). An agent is endowed with a
benchmark model but fears that it is misspecified. While making decisions, he
considers alternative distributions that are distorted versions of the distribution
implied by the benchmark, and balances the cost that an implicit misspecification
would cause against the plausibility of misspecification. In the benchmark model,
the state, control and innovation sequences are related by
xt+1 = f (xt, ut, εt+1), (38)
where xt is the state vector and ut is a vector of controls. Moreover, xt = (st, εt),
where st is the vector of predetermined state variables and εt is the vector of states
unknown upon entering the period. As in Bidder and Smith (2012), {εt} is an IID
innovation process. Let θ > 0 be the penalty parameter that controls the degree of
robustness. The value function of the agent satisfies the Bellman equation
v(s, ε) = max
u
{
r(s, ε, u)− βθ log
[
E s′,ε′|s exp
(
−v(s
′, ε′)
θ
)]}
subject to (38). Consider the plan factorization (W0, W1) defined by
W0v(s) := −θ log
{
E s′,ε′|s exp
[−v(s′, ε′)/θ]} and W1g(s) := r(s, ε, u) + βg(s).
Then the refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is
Sg(s) = −θ log
{
E s′,ε′|s exp
[
−maxu′ {r(s
′, ε′, u′) + βg(s′)}
θ
]}
subject to x′′ = f (x′, u′, ε′′). While the value function is a function of both s and ε,
the refactored value function acts only on s.
5.4. Targeted Government Transfers. Oh and Reis (2012) studies the effect of gov-
ernment transfers in a general equilibrium framework. In the household sector, kt
denotes capital, ct is consumption, nt ∈ {0, 1} is the choice to work or not, r is the
gross interest rate, w is the average wage, d is dividend, τ is lump-sum tax, L is a
lump-sum transfer function, and I is an insurance payments function. Moreover,
ht is agent’s health status, which is IID, while st is individual-specific salary offer,
which is Markov. The Bellman operator of the household is
Tv(k, s, h) = max
c,n,k′
{
ln c− χ(1− h)n + βE s′,h′|s v(k′, s′, h′)
}
(39)
29
subject to19
c, k′ > 0 and c + k′ = (1− δ+ r)k + swn + d− τ + L(s, h) + I(k, s, h). (40)
Consider the plan factorization (W0, W1), where
W0 v(s, k′) := E s′,h′|s v(k′, s′, h′)
and W1 g(k, s, h, c, n, k′) := ln c− χ(1− h)n + βg(s, k′).
The refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is then
Sg(s, k′) = E s′,h′|s max
c′,n′,k′′
{
ln c′ − χ(1− h′)n′ + βg(s′, k′′)} (41)
subject to
c′, k′′ > 0 and c′ + k′′ = (1− δ+ r)k′ + s′wn′ + d− τ + L(s′, h′) + I(k′, s′, h′).
Alternatively, we can factorize T by letting
W0v(k, s) := E hv(k, s, h)
and W1g(k, s, h, c, n, k′) := ln c− χ(1− h)n + βE s′|s g(k′, s′).
In this case, the refactored Bellman operator is
Sg(k, s) = E h max
c,n,k′
{
ln c− χ(1− h)n + βE s′|s g(k′, s′)
}
(42)
subject to (40). The function g in both (41) and (42) acts on two arguments, while v
in (39) acts on three.
5.5. Consumer Bankruptcy. Livshits et al. (2007) analyze consumer bankruptcy
rules in an OLG economy. An age j household’s income is zjηj e¯j, where e¯j is la-
bor endowment (deterministic), and zj and ηj are respectively the persistent and
transitory components of productivity. Let qj(dj+1, zj) be the interest rate for age
j borrowers, where dj+1 is their debt level. Households face an expense shock
κj > 0. While {zj} is Markov, {ηj} and {κj} are IID, and all shocks are mutually
independent.
In each period, households realize productivity and expense shocks and then de-
cide whether to file for bankruptcy or not. If households do not declare bank-
ruptcy, then they choose their current consumption and next period asset hold-
ings. Households that file for bankruptcy are unable to save in the current period,
19Here χ is the disutility from working and δ is the depreciation rate. Moreover, households
take r, w, d and τ as given.
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a fraction γ is deducted from their earnings, and they consume all the remaining.
The value of repaying one’s debts, vR, satisfies the Bellman equation
vRj (d, z, η, κ) = maxc, d′
[
u(c/n) + βE z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
vRj+1(d
′, z′, η′, κ′), vDj+1(z
′, η′)
}]
subject to c + d + κ 6 e¯zη + qj(d′, z)d′, where β is discount factor, c is total con-
sumption, n is household size, u is utility function, and vD is the value of declaring
bankruptcy, which satisfies
vDj (z, η) = u(c/n) + βE z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
vRj+1(0, z
′, η′, κ′), vEj+1(z
′, η′, κ′)
}
subject to c = (1− γ)e¯zη. In particular, bankruptcy cannot be declared two pe-
riods in a row. If a bankrupt household defaults on expense debt, a fraction γ of
the household’s current income is deducted and its debt is rolled over at a fixed
interest rate r¯. The value of defaulting on expense debt, denoted by vE, satisfies
vEj (z, η, κ) = u(c/n) + βE z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
vRj+1(d
′, z′, η′, κ′), vDj+1(z
′, η′)
}
subject to c = (1− γ)e¯zη and d′ = (κ − γe¯zη)(1+ r¯).
Hence, the Bellman operator T is defined at (vRj+1, v
D
j+1, v
E
j+1) by
T(vRj+1, v
D
j+1, v
E
j+1)(d, z, η, κ) =
(
vRj (d, z, η, κ), v
D
j (z, η), v
E
j (z, η, κ)
)
.
The problem can be significantly simplified via a plan factorization, with
W0(vRj+1, v
D
j+1, v
E
j+1)(z, d
′) :=
(
gRDj (z, d
′), gREj (z)
)
and
W1(gRDj , g
RE
j )(d, z, η, κ, c, d
′) :=
(
hRj (d, z, η, κ, c, d
′), hDj (z, η), h
E
j (z, η, κ)
)
,
where
gRDj (z, d
′) := E z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
vRj+1(d
′, z′, η′, κ′), vDj+1(z
′, η′)
}
,
gREj (z) := E z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
vRj+1(0, z
′, η′, κ′), vEj+1(z
′, η′, κ′)
}
,
hRj (d, z, η, κ, c, d
′) := u(c/n) + βgRDj (z, d
′),
hDj (z, η) := u[(1− γ)e¯zη/n] + βgREj (z),
and hEj (z, η, κ) := u[(1− γ)e¯zη/n] + βgRDj [z, (κ − γe¯zη)(1+ r¯)].
Then S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is defined at (gRDj+1, gREj+1) by
S(gRDj+1, g
RE
j+1)(z, d
′) =
(
gRDj (z, d
′), gREj (z)
)
,
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where
gRDj (z, d
′) = E z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
max
c′, d′′
[
u(c′/n′) + βgRDj+1(z
′, d′′)
]
, u(c˜/n′) + βgREj+1(z
′)
}
subject to
c′ + d′ + κ′ 6 e¯′z′η′ + qj+1(d′′, z′)d′′ and c˜ = (1− γ)e¯′z′η′,
and
gREj (z) = E z′,η′,κ′|z max
{
max
c′, d′′
[
u(c′/n′) + βgRDj+1(z
′, d′′)
]
, u(c˜/n′) + βgRDj+1(z
′, d˜)
}
subject to
c′ + κ′ 6 e¯′z′η′ + qj+1(d′′, z′)d′′, c˜ = (1− γ)e¯′z′η′ and d˜ = (κ′ − γe¯′z′η′)(1+ r¯).
While the standard value function has four arguments, the refactored value func-
tion has only two.
5.6. Optimal Default. Athreya (2008) studies the effect of default, insurance and
debt over the life-cycle in an OLG economy. At age j, households receive endow-
ments in the form of income and public transfers. The income follows
ln yj = µj + zj + ε j, zj = γzj−1 + ηj, {ε j} IID∼ N(0, σ2ε ), {ηj} IID∼ N(0, σ2η),
where µj, zj and ε j are respectively mean log income, and persistent and transitory
shocks. Public transfer τj(xj, yj) depends on age j, net assets xj and income yj.
Each period, households make the decision to default or not. They are not allowed
to issue debt within the period they default. However, they may save and can
borrow in subsequent periods. After the default decision, the savings plan is made.
Their value function satisfies
vj(x, z, ε) = max
{
vRj (x, z, ε), v
D
j (x, z, ε)
}
. (43)
Here vRj is the value of repaying the debt that comes due at age j, satisfying
vRj (x, z, ε) = maxc, x′
{
u(c) + βE z′, ε′|z vj+1(x′, z′, ε′)
}
subject to
c + x′/Rj(x′, z) 6 y + τj(x, y) + x, (44)
where u(c) is the utility from current consumption c and Rj(x′, z) is the current
interest rate of the (one-period mature) debt.20
20See section 2.5 of Athreya (2008) for how Rj(xj+1, zj) is endogenously determined.
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Moreover, vDj denotes the value of eliminating debts via default, satisfying
vDj (x, z, ε) = maxc, x′
{
u(c)− λ+ βE z′, ε′|z vj+1(x′, z′, ε′)
}
subject to
c + x′/R f 6 y + τj(x, y) and x′ > 0, (45)
where the scalars λ and R f are respectively the cost of default and annuitized dis-
count rate.
The Bellman operator T is defined at vj+1 by Tvj+1(x, z, ε) = vj(x, z, ε). We can
simplify via a plan factorization, with
W0vj+1(x′, z) := E z′, ε′|z vj+1(x′, z′, ε′) and W1gj(x, z, ε) :=
(
hRj (x, z, ε), h
D
j (x, z, ε)
)
,
where
hRj (x, z, ε) := maxc,x′
{
u(c) + βgj(x′, z)
}
s.t. (44)
and hDj (x, z, ε) := maxc,x′
{
u(c)− λ+ βgj(x′, z)
}
s.t. (45).
Then the refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is defined at gj+1 by
gj(x′, z) := Sgj+1(x′, z) = E z′, ε′|z max{hRj+1(x′, z′, ε′), hDj+1(x′, z′, ε′)},
where hRj+1 and h
D
j+1 are respectively subject to
c′ + x′′/Rj+1(x′′, z′) 6 y′ + τj+1(x′, y′) + x′ and
c′ + x′′/R f 6 y′ + τj+1(x′, y′) and x′′ > 0.
The refactored value function g has two arguments, while v in (43) has three.
5.7. Portfolio Choice with Annuities. In an OLG framework, Pashchenko (2013)
studies the portfolio choice problem between bonds and annuities. Denote j as
the agent’s age, cj as consumption and k j+1 as investment in bonds. Utilities from
consumption and bequest are denoted respectively by u(cj) and Γ(k j). Let mj ∈
{0, 1} be the agent’s health status, which is Markov. An agent survives to the next
period with probability sj(mj, I), where I is permanent income. Each period, the
agent has to pay a medical cost zj, satisfying
ln zj = µj(mj, I) + σzψj, ψj = ζ j + ξ j and ζ j = ρζ j−1 + ε j,
where {ξ j} IID∼ N(0, σ2ξ ) and {ε j}
IID∼ N(0, σ2ε ). An agent without enough resources
to pay for medical expenses receives government transfer τj, which guarantees a
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minimum consumption cmin. The agent has two investment options: a risk-free
bond with return r and an annuity. By paying qj∆j+1 today, the agent buys a stream
of payments ∆j+1 that he will receive each period (if alive). Let nj denote the total
annuity income and xj := (I, nj, k j). The Bellman operator T is
vj(x, m, ζ, ξ) := Tvj+1(x, m, ζ, ξ)
= max
c, k′,∆′
{
u(c) + βsjE m′,ζ ′,ξ ′|x,m,ζ vj+1(x′, m′, ζ ′, ξ ′) + β(1− sj)Γ(k′)
}
subject to
c + z + k′ + q∆′ = (1+ r)k + n + τ, n′ = ∆′ + n, sj = sj(m, I),
τ = min{0, cmin − k(1+ r)− n + z} and k′,∆′ > 0.
Consider the plan factorization (W0, W1), where
W0vj(x, m, ζ) := E ξ vj(x, m, ζ, ξ) and
W1gj+1(x, m, ζ, ξ, c, k′,∆) := u(c) + βsjE m′,ζ ′|x,m,ζ gj+1(x′, m′, ζ ′) + β(1− sj)Γ(k′).
Then the refactored Bellman operator S = W0 ◦M ◦W1 is
gj(x, m, ζ) := Sgj+1(x, m, ζ)
= E ξ max
c, k′,∆′
{
u(c) + βsjE m′,ζ ′|x,m,ζ gj+1(x′, m′, ζ ′) + β(1− sj)Γ(k′)
}
.
Observe that gj has one argument less than vj.
6. APPENDIX
In sections 6.1–6.4, we prove all the theoretical results. In section 6.5, we provide
counterexamples in support of the theory of section 3.2.
6.1. Preliminaries. Let Ei be a nonempty set and let τi be a mapping from Ei to
Ei+1 for i = 0, 1, 2 with addition modulo 3 (a convention we adopt throughout this
section). Consider the self-mappings
F0 := τ2 ◦ τ1 ◦ τ0, F1 := τ0 ◦ τ2 ◦ τ1 and F2 := τ1 ◦ τ0 ◦ τ2
on E0, E1 and E2 respectively. We then have
Fi+1 ◦ τi = τi ◦ Fi on Ei for i = 0, 1, 2. (46)
Lemma 6.1. For each i = 0, 1, 2,
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(1) if e is a fixed point of Fi in Ei, then τi e is a fixed point of Fi+1 in Ei+1.
(2) Fni+1 ◦ τi = τi ◦ Fni on Ei for all n ∈ N.
Proof. Regarding part (a), if e is a fixed point of Fi in Ei, then (46) yields Fi+1τi e =
τi Fie = τi e, so τi e is a fixed point of Fi+1. Regarding part (b), fix i in {0, 1, 2}. By
(46), the statement in (b) is true at n = 1. Let it also be true at n− 1. Then, using
(46) again,
Fni+1 ◦ τi = Fn−1i+1 ◦ Fi+1 ◦ τi = Fn−1i+1 ◦ τi ◦ Fi = τi ◦ Fn−1i ◦ Fi = τi ◦ Fni .
We conclude that (b) holds at every n ∈ N. 
Lemma 6.2. If Fi has unique fixed point ei in Ei for some i in {0, 1, 2}, then τi ei is the
unique fixed point of Fi+1 in Ei+1.
Proof. We have already proved all but uniqueness. To see that uniqueness holds,
fix i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and suppose that Fi has only one fixed point in Ei, whereas Fi+1 has
two fixed points in Ei+1. Denote the fixed points of Fi+1 by e and f . Applying part
(a) of lemma 6.1 twice, we see that τi+2 τi+1 e and τi+2 τi+1 f are both fixed points
of Fi+3 = Fi. Since Fi has only one fixed point, we then have
τi+2 τi+1 e = τi+2 τi+1 f .
Applying τi to both sides of the last equality gives Fi+1e = Fi+1 f . Since e and f are
both fixed points of Fi+1, we conclude that e = f and the fixed point is unique. 
6.2. Multiple Maps. Consider the same set up as section 6.1, but now, instead of
a single map τ2, suppose instead that we have a family of stage 2 maps {τσ}, each
one sending E2 to E0, and indexed by σ ∈ Σ. In addition, suppose that Ei is par-
tially ordered by . The ordering on each set is not necessarily related, although
we do not distinguish between them in our notation. Let τ¯ be the pointwise supre-
mum of {τσ} with respect to . In other words,
τ¯e := sup
σ∈Σ
τσ e (e ∈ E2). (47)
An index σ ∈ Σ is called e-greedy if τ¯e = τσ e. We assume that this supremum exists
and, moreover, the sup can be replaced with max:
Assumption 6.1. For each e in E2, there exists at least one e-greedy σ in Σ.
35
For each σ ∈ Σ, we consider the self-mappings
Fσ0 := τσ ◦ τ1 ◦ τ0, Fσ1 := τ0 ◦ τσ ◦ τ1 and Fσ2 := τ1 ◦ τ0 ◦ τσ. (48)
In addition, define
F0 := τ¯ ◦ τ1 ◦ τ0, F1 := τ0 ◦ τ¯ ◦ τ1 and F2 := τ1 ◦ τ0 ◦ τ¯. (49)
In the following assumption, the “and hence every” statement is due to lemma 6.2.
Assumption 6.2. For each σ in Σ, the map Fσi has a unique fixed point e
σ
i in Ei for
one, and hence every, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
When assumption 6.2 holds, we let
e∗i := sup
σ∈Σ
eσi (50)
for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} whenever the supremum exists.
To simplify the statement and proof of the next proposition, let the one step maps
be denoted by Rσ and R respectively. In particular, for fixed σ, the map Rσ equals
τ0 on E0, τ1 on E1 and τσ on E2. The map R is similar but with τσ replaced by τ¯. It
follows that Fσi = R
3
σ on Ei and Fi = R3 on Ei. Note that, from the definition of τ¯,
the map R pointwise dominates Rσ, in the sense that R e  Rσ e for every e ∈ Ei.
Proposition 6.3. Fix i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and suppose that assumptions 6.1–6.2 hold. If τα is
isotone for all α ∈ {0, 1} ∪ Σ and e∗i is a fixed point of Fi in Ei, then
e∗i+1 = R e
∗
i (51)
and e∗i+1 is a fixed point of Fi+1 in Ei+1.
Proof. Let the hypotheses in the proposition be true. In view of lemma 6.1, to show
that e∗i+1 is a fixed point of Fi+1, it suffices to show that (51) holds. Pick any σ ∈ Σ.
We have
eσi+1 = Rσ e
σ
i  R eσi  R e∗i ,
where the equality is due to part (a) of lemma 6.1, the first inequality is due to the
fact that R pointwise dominates Rσ and the second follows from the definition of
e∗i . As σ was arbitrary, this proves that e
∗
i+1  R e∗i .
Regarding the reverse inequality, from Fi e∗i = e
∗
i and assumption 6.1, which im-
plies the existence of at σ such that τ¯ = τσ and hence Fσi e
∗
i = Fi e
∗
i , we see that
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e∗i is a fixed point of F
σ
i . Therefore, by assumption 6.2, e
∗
i = e
σ
i . As a result,
R e∗i = Rσ e
σ
i = e
σ
i+1. But e
σ
i+1  e∗i+1, so R e∗i  e∗i+1.
As a partial order,  is by definition antisymmetric, so (51) holds. 
Corollary 6.4. Assume the conditions of proposition 6.3. If e∗i ∈ Ei and Fi e∗i = e∗i for at
least one i, then the same is true for all i, and
eσ0 = e
∗
0 ⇐⇒ Fσ0 e∗0 = F0 e∗0 ⇐⇒ τσ τ1 e∗1 = τ¯ τ1 e∗1 . (52)
Proof. If the hypotheses of proposition 6.3 hold, e∗i ∈ Ei and Fie∗i = e∗i for at least
one i, then, proposition 6.3 tells us that the same is true for all i, and the fixed points
are linked by e∗i+1 = R e
∗
i . In this setting we have
eσ0 = e
∗
0 ⇐⇒ Fσ0 e∗0 = F0 e∗0 . (53)
Indeed, if eσ0 = e
∗
0 , then
Fσ0 e
∗
0 = F
σ
0 e
σ
0 = e
σ
0 = e
∗
0 = F0 e
∗
0 .
Conversely, if Fσ0 e
∗
0 = F0 e
∗
0 , then, since e
∗
0 is in E0 and, by assumption 6.2, the point
eσ0 is the only fixed point of F
σ
0 in E0, we have e
σ
0 = e
∗
0 .
We have now verified (53). The last equivalence in (52) follows, since, by the rela-
tions e∗i+1 = R e
∗
i and e
σ
i+1 = Rσ e
σ
i , we have
τσ τ1 e∗1 = τσ τ1 τ0 e
∗
0 = F
σ
0 e
∗
0 = F0 e
∗
0 = τ¯ τ1 τ0 e
∗
0 = τ¯ τ1 e
∗
1 . 
6.3. Connection to Dynamic Programming. Now we switch to a dynamic pro-
gramming setting that builds on the results presented above. When connecting to
the results in sections 6.1–6.2, we always take E0 = V, E1 = G and E2 = H. The
partial order  becomes the pointwise partial order. In addition, we set τ0 = W0
and τ1 = W1. The map τ2 will vary depending on context.
Proof of proposition 2.1. The claims are immediate from lemma 6.1. In particular,
regarding iterations on S and T, we set τ2 = M. Regarding iterations on Sσ and Tσ,
we fix σ ∈ Σ and set τ2 = Mσ. 
Proof of proposition 2.2. The claims are immediate from lemmas 6.1–6.2 once we set
τ2 = M. 
Proof of proposition 2.3. Similar to the proof of proposition 2.2, this result is imme-
diate from lemmas 6.1–6.2 once we fix σ ∈ Σ and set τ2 = Mσ. 
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Proof of theorem 3.2. Assume the conditions of theorem 3.2. Let τ0 and τ1 have the
identifications given at the start of this section and let {τσ}σ∈Σ = {Mσ}σ∈Σ. Then,
fixing σ ∈ Σ, the following identifications follow:
• τ¯ corresponds to M, since Mh = supσ∈Σ Mσh for all h ∈ H by (19).
• F0 = τ¯ ◦ τ1 ◦ τ0 = M ◦W1 ◦W0 = T, the Bellman operator.
• F1 = τ0 ◦ τ¯ ◦ τ1 = W0 ◦M ◦W1 = S, the refactored Bellman operator.
• Similarly, Fσ0 and Fσ1 defined in (48) correspond to Tσ and Sσ respectively.
• eσ0 corresponds to vσ for each σ ∈ Σ, and e∗0 corresponds to v∗.
• eσ1 corresponds to gσ for each σ ∈ Σ, and e∗1 corresponds to g∗.
Note that the conditions of proposition 6.3 are then valid, because W0 and W1 are
isotone by assumption, Mσ and M are clearly isotone, and assumptions 2.1–2.2,
which are held to be true in theorem 3.2, imply assumptions 6.1–6.2.
Now suppose that (a) of theorem 3.2 holds, so that g∗ ∈ G and Sg∗ = g∗. We
claim that (b) holds, which is to say that v∗ ∈ V and Tv∗ = v∗. In the notation of
proposition 6.3, we are seeking to show that
e∗1 ∈ E1 and F1 e∗1 = e∗1 =⇒ e∗0 ∈ E0 and F0 e∗0 = e∗0 . (54)
This follows from proposition 6.3 because if e∗i ∈ Ei and Fi e∗i = e∗i at i = 1, then
the same is true at i + 1 = 2, and hence again at i + 2 = 0 with addition modulo 3.
The claim that (b) implies (a) translates to
e∗0 ∈ E0 and F0 e∗0 = e∗0 =⇒ e∗1 ∈ E1 and F1 e∗1 = e∗1 , (55)
which follows directly from proposition 6.3.
The claim that g∗ = gˆ under (a)–(b) translates to the claim that e∗1 = Re
∗
0 , which
also follows directly from proposition 6.3.
The claim in theorem 3.2 that at least one optimal policy exists under either (a)
or (b) follows from the equivalence of (a) and (b) just established combined with
theorem 3.1.
Finally, suppose that (a) holds and consider the last claim in theorem 3.2, which
can be expressed succinctly as
vσ = v∗ ⇐⇒ Tσv∗ = Tv∗ ⇐⇒ MσW1g∗ = MW1g∗.
In the notation of corollary 6.4, this is precisely (52). Since the conditions of corol-
lary 6.4 hold, the last claim in theorem 3.2 is established. 
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6.4. Remaining Proofs.
Proof of theorem 3.1. We first show that (a) implies (b). By definition,
σ∗ is v∗-greedy ⇐⇒ Q(x, σ∗(x), v∗) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v∗) ⇐⇒ Tσ∗v∗ = Tv∗.
Since v∗ = Tv∗ by (a), Tσ∗v∗ = Tv∗ implies that Tσ∗v∗ = v∗. However, since vσ∗
is the unique fixed point of Tσ∗ in V by assumption 2.2, we must have v∗ = vσ∗ .
Hence, Tσ∗v∗ = Tv∗ if and only if v∗ = vσ∗ . We then have
σ∗ is v∗-greedy ⇐⇒ v∗ = vσ∗ ⇐⇒ σ∗ is optimal,
where the second equivalence is due to the definition of optimal policy. Bellman’s
principle of optimality is verified. Since v∗ ∈ V, assumption 2.1 implies that there
exists a v∗-greedy policy σ∗ ∈ Σ. Based on Bellman’s principle of optimality, σ∗ is
optimal, so the set of optimal policies is nonempty. Hence, claim (b) holds.
Next we show that (b) implies (a). Let σ∗ ∈ Σ be an optimal policy. Then vσ∗ = v∗.
Since vσ∗ ∈ V by assumption 2.2, we have v∗ ∈ V. Suppose v∗ does not satisfy the
Bellman equation. Then there exists x ∈ X such that
v∗(x) 6= Tv∗(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v∗). (56)
Based on Bellman’s principle of optimality, σ∗ is v∗-greedy, which implies
Q(x, σ∗(x), v∗) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v∗).
Since vσ∗ = v∗, the definition of vσ∗ and assumption 2.2 imply that
v∗(x) = vσ∗(x) = Q(x, σ∗(x), vσ∗) = Q(x, σ∗(x), v∗) = max
a∈Γ(x)
Q(x, a, v∗).
However, this is contradicted with (56). Hence, v∗ satisfies the Bellman operator
and claim (a) holds. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of theorem 3.3. Assume the hypotheses of the theorem. We need only show
that (a) holds, since the remaining claims follow directly from these hypotheses,
claim (a), the definition of asymptotic stability (for part (b)) and theorem 3.2 (for
parts (c) and (d)).
To see that (a) holds, note that, by the stated hypotheses, S has a unique fixed point
inG, which we denote below by g¯. Our aim is to show that g¯ = g∗.
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First observe that, by existence of greedy policies, there is a σ ∈ Σ such that Sσ g¯ =
Sg¯ = g¯. But, by assumption 2.2 and proposition 2.3, Sσ has exactly one fixed point,
which is the refactored σ-value function gσ. Hence g¯ = gσ. In particular, g¯ 6 g∗.
To see that the reverse inequality holds, pick any σ ∈ Σ and note that, by the
definition of S, we have g¯ = Sg¯ > Sσ g¯. We know that Sσ is isotone onG, since this
operator is the composition of three isotone operators (W0 and W1 by assumption
and Mσ automatically). Hence we can iterate on the last inequality to establish
g¯ > Skσ g¯ for all k ∈ N. Taking limits and using the fact that the partial order is
closed, Sσ is asymptotically stable and, as shown above, gσ is the unique fixed
point, we have g¯ > gσ. Since σ was chosen arbitrarily, this yields g¯ > g∗. That part
(a) of theorem 3.3 holds is now established. 
Proof of proposition 3.4. As a closed subset of bκF under the ‖ · ‖κ-norm metric, the
set G is complete under the same metric and, by (24) and the Banach contrac-
tion mapping theorem, each Sσ is asymptotically stable. Moreover, the pointwise
partial order 6 is closed under this metric. Thus, to verify the conditions of the-
orem 3.3, we need only show that S is also asymptotically stable under the same
metric.
To this end, we first claim that, under the stated assumptions,
Sg(x, a) = max
σ∈Σ
Sσg(x, a), for all (x, a) ∈ F and g ∈ G. (57)
To see that (57) holds, fix g ∈ G and observe that, by assmption 2.1, we have
M W1 g = supσ∈Σ Mσ W1 g when the supremum is defined in terms of pointwise
order. It follows that, for any σ ∈ Σ we have M W1 g > Mσ W1 g and hence, ap-
plying W0 to both sides and using isotonicity yields Sg > Sσg. Moreover, if σ is a
g-greedy policy then by definition we have M W1 g = Mσ W1 g and applying W0 to
both sides again gives Sg = Sσg at this σ. Hence (57) is valid.
Now fix g, g′ ∈ G and (x, a) ∈ F. By (57) and the contraction condition on Sσ in
(24), we have
|Sg(x, a)− Sg′(x, a)| = |max
σ∈Σ
Sσg(x, a)−max
σ∈Σ
Sσg′(x, a)|
6 max
σ∈Σ
|Sσg(x, a)− Sσg′(x, a)|.
Therefore
|Sg(x, a)− Sg′(x, a)|
κ(x, a)
6 max
σ∈Σ
‖Sσg− Sσg′‖κ 6 α‖g− g′‖κ.
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Taking the supremum gives ‖Sg− Sg′‖κ 6 α ‖g− g′‖κ, so S is a contraction map-
ping on G of modulus α and it is asymptotically stable. Moreover, since all the
conditions of theorem 3.3 are verified, its conclusions follow. 
Proof of proposition 3.5. Without loss of generality, we assume that mk ≡ m for all
k ∈ N0. Let Σvk and Σgk denote respectively the set of vk-greedy and gk-greedy
policies. When k = 0, by the definition of greedy policies, we have
Σv0 = {σ ∈ Σ : MσW1W0v0 = MW1W0v0} = {σ ∈ Σ : MσW1g0 = MσW1g0} = Σg0 ,
i.e., the sets of v0-greedy and g0-greedy policies are identical, with Σ0 = Σv0 = Σ
g
0 .
This in turn implies that a policy σ0 ∈ Σ is v0-greedy if and only if it is g0-greedy.
Moreover, by proposition 2.1, we have
g1 = Smσ0 g0 = W0T
m−1
σ0
Mσ0W1g0 = W0T
m−1
σ0
Mσ0W1W0v0
= W0Tm−1σ0 Tσ0v0 = W0T
m
σ0
v0 = W0v1
We have thus verified the related claims for k = 0. Suppose these claims hold for
arbitrary k. It remains to show that they hold for k + 1. By the induction hypoth-
esis, Σvk = Σ
g
k = Σk, a policy σk ∈ Σ is vk-greedy if and only if it is gk-greedy, and
gk+1 = W0vk+1. By the definition of greedy policies, we have
Σvk+1 = {σ ∈ Σ : MσW1W0vk+1 = MW1W0vk+1}
= {σ ∈ Σ : MσW1gk+1 = MW1gk+1} = Σgk+1 = Σk+1
and a policy σk+1 ∈ Σ is vk+1-greedy if and only if it is gk+1-greedy. Moreover,
proposition 2.1 implies that
gk+2 = Smσk+1 gk+1 = W0T
m−1
σk+1
Mσk+1W1gk+1
= W0Tm−1σk+1 Mσk+1W1W0vk+1 = W0T
m
σk+1
vk+1 = W0vk+2.
Hence, the related claims of the proposition hold for k + 1, completing the proof.

Proof of theorem 3.6. Without loss of generality, we assume mk ≡ m for all k ∈ N0.
Let {ωk} be defined by ω0 := g0 and ωk := Sωk−1. We show by induction that
ωk 6 gk 6 g∗ and gk 6 Sgk for all k ∈ N0. (58)
Note that g0 6 Sg0 by assumption. Since S is isotone, this implies that g0 6 Stg0
for all t ∈ N0. Letting t → ∞, theorem 3.3 implies that g0 6 g∗. Since in addition
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ω0 = g0, (58) is satisfied for k = 0. Suppose this claim holds for arbitrary k ∈ N0.
Then, since S and Sσk are isotone,
gk+1 = Smσk gk 6 SS
m−1
σk
gk 6 SSm−1σk Sgk = SS
m
σk
gk = Sgk+1,
where the first inequality holds by the definition of S, the second inequality holds
since gk 6 Sgk (the induction hypothesis), and the second equality is due to σk ∈
Σk. Hence, gk+1 6 Stgk+1 for all t ∈ N0. Letting t→ ∞ yields gk+1 6 g∗.
Similarly, since gk 6 Sgk = Sσk gk, we have gk 6 Sm−1σk gk and thus
ωk+1 = Sωk 6 Sgk = Sσk gk 6 Smσk gk = gk+1.
Hence, (58) holds by induction. The isotonicity of Sσk implies that
gk 6 Sgk = Sσk gk 6 · · · 6 Smσk gk = gk+1
for all k ∈ N0. Hence, {gk} is increasing in k. Moreover, since ωk → g∗ by theorem
3.3, (58) implies that gk → g∗ as k→ ∞. 
Proof of lemma 4.1. Fix g ∈ G. Since g is bounded below, hg(0) = r(0, 0) + βg(0) ∈
R ∪ {−∞} and hg is well defined at x = 0. Since r is continuous, we know that
(see footnote 17) either (i) r is continuous on D0 and lima→x r(x, a) = −∞, or (ii) r
is continuous everywhere and r > −∞ on D/D0. In each scenario, for all x > 0,
since g is continuous, the maximum in the definition of hg can be attained at some
x0 ∈ [0, x] and hg is well defined at x. Hence, hg is well defined on R+. Regarding
monotonicity, let x1, x2 ∈ R+ with x1 < x2. By the monotonicity of r (w.r.t x), we
have
hg(x1) 6 max
a∈[0,x1]
{r(x2, a) + βg(a)} 6 max
a∈[0,x2]
{r(x2, a) + βg(a)} = hg(x2).
Hence, claim (a) holds. Claims (b)–(d) follow from the theorem of maximum (see,
e.g., theorem 3.6 of Stokey et al. (1989)), adjusted to accommodate the case of pos-
sibly negative infinity valued objective functions. 
Proof of theorem 4.2. To prove the desired results, we only need to verify that the
assumptions of proposition 3.4 hold in the current context. Note that W0 and W1
are isotone by construction. Moreover, one can show that G is a closed subset of
bκF.
To verify assumption 2.1, it suffices to show the existence of g-greedy policies. Fix
g ∈ G. By lemma 4.1 and the measurable selection theorem (see, e.g., theorem
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7.6 of Stokey et al. (1989)), there exists a measurable map σ : X → A such that
σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) and MW1g = MσW1g. Hence, Sg = Sσg. To show that σ is g-greedy,
it remains to verify Sσg ∈ G (which guarantees σ ∈ Σ). We first show that Sσg is
Borel measurable. The monotonicity of hg established in lemma 4.1 implies that hg
is Borel measurable. The measurability of f and the property ofR then imply that
R+ 3 a 7→ Sσg(a) = Sg(a) = (R ◦ hg ◦ f )(a, ξ) ∈ R
is also Borel measurable.
Next, we show that Sσg is bounded below. Since g is bounded below, there exists
M ∈ R such that g > M. Then, by the monotonicity of r and f ,
(hg ◦ f )(a, z) > max
a′∈[0, f (a,z)]
r
(
f (a, z), a′
)
+ βM
= r( f (a, z), 0) + βM > r( f (0, z), 0) + βM.
The monotonicity ofR and assumption 4.1-(e) then imply that
Sσg(a) = Sg(a) = (R ◦ hg ◦ f )(a, ξ) > R (r( f (0, ξ), 0) + βM) > −∞
for all a ∈ R+. Hence, Sσg is bounded below.
Our next job is to show that Sσg is κ-bounded above. By the definition ofR, condi-
tions (a), (b) and (d) of assumption 4.1, and the properties of g, there exists K ∈ R+
such that
Sσg(a) = R{r( f (a, ξ), σ[ f (a, ξ)]) + βg(σ[ f (a, ξ)])}
6 R{r( f (a, ξ), 0) + βg[ f (a, ξ)]}
6 R{(d + βK)κ[ f (a, ξ)]} 6 E {(d + βK)κ[ f (a, ξ)]}
= (d + βK)
∫
R+
κ[ f (a, z)]µ(dz) 6 (d + βK)α κ(a)
for all a ∈ R+. Hence, supa∈R+ [Sσg(a)/κ(a)] < ∞.
Next, we show that Sσg is increasing. For all a1, a2 ∈ R+ with a1 < a2, the mono-
tonicity of f (w.r.t a) implies that f (a1, z) 6 f (a2, z). By lemma 4.1, (hg ◦ f )(a1, z) 6
(hg ◦ f )(a2, z). The monotonicity of R then implies that Sσg(a1) = Sg(a1) =
(R ◦ hg ◦ f )(a1, ξ) 6 (R ◦ hg ◦ f )(a2, ξ) = Sg(a2) = Sσg(a2).
We then show that Sσg is continuous. By assumption 4.1-(c), a 7→ f (a, z) is strictly
positive and continuous for almost all z. Lemma 4.1 then implies that a 7→ (hg ◦
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f )(a, z) is continuous for almost all z. Moreover, the above analysis implies that
r( f (0, z), 0) + βM 6 (hg ◦ f )(a, z) 6 (d + βK)κ[ f (a, z)].
By assumption 4.1-(f), a 7→ Sσg(a) = Sg(a) = (R ◦ hg ◦ f )(a, ξ) is continuous.
Now we have verified that Sσg ∈ G. Hence, assumption 2.1 holds.
Finally, we need to verify assumption 2.2 and (24). Note that the latter implies the
former. Fix σ ∈ Σ and g1, g2 ∈ G. Then, by conditions (a), (c) and (d) of assumption
4.1, we have
Sσg1(a)− Sσg2(a) = R{r( f (a, ξ), σ[ f (a, ξ)]) + βg1(σ[ f (a, ξ)])}
−R{r( f (a, ξ), σ[ f (a, ξ)]) + βg2(σ[ f (a, ξ)]}
6 R[βg1(σ[ f (a, ξ)])− βg2(σ[ f (a, ξ)])]
6 R (β‖g1 − g2‖κ κ[ f (a, ξ)]) 6 E (β‖g1 − g2‖κ κ[ f (a, ξ)])
= β‖g1 − g2‖κ
∫
R+
κ[ f (a, z)]µ(dz) 6 αβ‖g1 − g2‖κ κ(a)
for all a ∈ R+. Switching the roles of g1 and g2, we get
‖Sσg1 − Sσg2‖κ 6 αβ‖g1 − g2‖κ.
We have now verified all the assumptions of proposition 3.4. Hence, all the state-
ments of theorem 4.2 hold. 
6.5. Counterexamples. Counterexamples showing that isotonicity of W0 and W1
cannot be dropped from theorems 3.2 are provided in this section.
6.5.1. Counterexample 1. Here we exhibit a dynamic program and value transfor-
mation under which Tv∗ = v∗ and yet Sg∗ 6= g∗. In addition, the functions g∗ and
gˆ do not agree. The example involves risk sensitive preferences.
Let X := {1, 2}, A := {0, 1}, V := RX and Σ := {σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4}, where
σ1(1) = 0, σ1(2) = 0, σ2(1) = 0, σ2(2) = 1,
σ3(1) = 1, σ3(2) = 1, σ4(1) = 1, σ4(2) = 0.
In state x, choosing action a provides the agent with an immediate reward x− a. If
a = 0, then the next period state x′ = 1, while if a = 1, the next period state x′ = 2.
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The Bellman operator T is
Tv(x) = max
a∈{0,1}
{
x− a− β
γ
lnE a exp[−γv(x′)]
}
= max {x + βv(1), x− 1+ βv(2)} .
Suppose that we set
W0 v(a) := E a exp[−γv(x′)] and W1 g(x, a) := x− a− β
γ
ln g(a).
The refactored Bellman operator is therefore
Sg(a) = E a exp
[
−γ max
a′∈{0,1}
{
x′ − a′ − β
γ
ln g(a′)
}]
.
Note that neither W1 nor W0 is isotone. In the following, we assume that β ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 6.5. The σ-value functions are given by
vσ1(1) = 1/(1− β), vσ1(2) = (2− β)/(1− β),
vσ2(1) = 1/(1− β), vσ2(2) = 1/(1− β),
vσ3(1) = β/(1− β), vσ3(2) = 1/(1− β),
vσ4(1) = (2β)/(1− β2), vσ4(2) = 2/(1− β2).
Proof of lemma 6.5. Regarding vσ1 , by definition,
vσ1(1) = 1− σ1(1)−
β
γ
lnE σ1(1) exp[−γvσ1(x′)] = 1+ βvσ1(1)
and vσ1(2) = 2− σ1(2)−
β
γ
lnE σ1(2) exp[−γvσ1(x′)] = 2+ βvσ1(1).
Hence, vσ1(1) = 1/(1− β) and vσ1(2) = (2− β)/(1− β). Similarly, we can prove
the remaining results. 
Based on lemma 6.5, the value function v∗ satisfies
v∗(1) = max
σi
vσi(1) = vσ1(1) = vσ2(1) = 1/(1− β)
v∗(2) = max
σi
vσi(2) = vσ1(2) = (2− β)/(1− β).
Moreover, we have v∗ = Tv∗, since
Tv∗(1) = max{1+ βv∗(1), βv∗(2)} = 1/(1− β) = v∗(1)
and Tv∗(2) = max{2+ βv∗(1), 1+ βv∗(2)} = (2− β)/(1− β) = v∗(2).
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Lemma 6.6. The refactored σ-value functions are given by
gσ1(0) = exp[−γ/(1− β)], gσ1(1) = exp[−γ(2− β)/(1− β)],
gσ2(0) = exp[−γ/(1− β)], gσ2(1) = exp[−γ/(1− β)],
gσ3(0) = exp[−γβ/(1− β)], gσ3(1) = exp[−γ/(1− β)],
gσ4(0) = exp[−2γβ/(1− β2)], gσ4(1) = exp[−2γ/(1− β2)].
Proof of lemma 6.6. Regarding gσ1 , by definition,
gσ1(0) = E 0 exp
(
−γ
{
x′ − σ1(x′)− β
γ
ln gσ1 [σ1(x
′)]
})
= exp
(
−γ
[
1− β
γ
ln gσ1(0)
])
= exp(−γ)gσ1(0)β
and gσ1(1) = E 1 exp
(
−γ
{
x′ − σ1(x′)− β
γ
ln gσ1 [σ1(x
′)]
})
= exp
(
−γ
[
2− β
γ
ln gσ1(0)
])
= exp(−2γ)gσ1(0)β.
Hence, gσ1(0) = exp[−γ/(1 − β)] and gσ1(1) = exp[−γ(2 − β)/(1 − β)]. The
remaining results can be proved similarly. 
Based on lemma 6.6, the refactored value function g∗ satisfies
g∗(0) = max
σi
gσi(0) = gσ3(0) = exp[−γβ/(1− β)]
and g∗(1) = max
σi
gσi(0) = gσ2(1) = gσ3(1) = exp[−γ/(1− β)].
Since gˆ(0) = W0v∗(0) = exp[−γv∗(1)] = exp[−γ/(1− β)] 6= g∗(0), we know that
g∗ 6= gˆ. Moreover,
Sg∗(0) = exp
(
−γmax
{
1− β
γ
ln g∗(0),− β
γ
ln g∗(1)
})
= exp[−γ(1− β+ β2)/(1− β2)] 6= g∗(0).
Hence, g∗ 6= Sg∗ and the refactored value function is not a fixed point of the refac-
tored Bellman operator.
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6.5.2. Counterexample 2. We now exhibit a dynamic program and plan factoriza-
tion under which Sg∗ = g∗ but Tv∗ 6= v∗. Moreover, the functions g∗ and gˆ do not
agree.
The set up is the same as the previous counterexample in section 6.5.1, except that
we assume β > 1. In this case, lemmas 6.5–6.6 still hold. Moreover, as in sec-
tion 6.5.1, the value function and refactored value function are
v∗(1) = 1/(1− β), v∗(2) = (2− β)/(1− β),
g∗(0) = exp[−γβ/(1− β)], g∗(1) = exp[−γ/(1− β)].
Recall that in section 6.5.1 we have also verified g∗ 6= gˆ. Moreover,
Sg∗(0) = exp
(
−γmax
{
1− β
γ
ln g∗(0),− β
γ
ln g∗(1)
})
= exp[−γβ/(1− β)] = g∗(0)
and Sg∗(1) = exp
(
−γmax
{
2− β
γ
ln g∗(0), 1− β
γ
ln g∗(1)
})
= exp[−γ/(1− β)] = g∗(1).
Hence, Sg∗ = g∗ as claimed. However,
Tv∗(1) = max
{
1− β
γ
lnE 0 exp[−γv∗(x′)], − β
γ
lnE 1 exp[−γv∗(x′)]
}
= max{1+ βv∗(1), βv∗(2)} = (2β− β2)/(1− β) 6= v∗(1).
Hence, Tv∗ 6= v∗ and the value function is not a fixed point of the Bellman operator.
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